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I. Introduction
What does America want from its allies during austere times?  Or, to put it another way, what do reduced 
defence budgets mean for the US’s alliance relationships and for the alliance partners themselves?  These 
are critically important and likewise complex questions with policy responses still at a relatively early stage. 
Nonetheless—while recognizing it verges on the hubristic to suggest one can know in detail “what America 
wants”—it is possible to sketch the outlines of the geostrategic environment and see what a more austere 
situation already means and likely will mean for US and allied interests and action.
This paper will first consider two of the fundamental factors shaping the current strategic environment, defence 
resources on the one hand and the key security trends on the other.  From there, as discussed in the next section, 
the parameters of “what America wants” becomes more clear as does what makes sense for overall allied 
interests—including those of Australia—going forward.  Some concluding words offer a longer-term assessment as 
a counterpoint to much of the current conventional wisdom about the future regional strategic environment.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
•	 Work with US partners to define and build a more expansive and comprehensive mutual security 
framework at both political and working levels, to encompass greater engagement across the spectrum 
of the relationship: on trade and investment; greener energy solutions; diplomatic initiatives; people-to-
people exchanges; education, innovation and science programs; and defence and security cooperation.
•	 Continue to engage and encourage active US participation in and commitment to effective, problem-
oriented multilateral mechanisms in the region, both formal and informal, including multilateral 
collaborations, consultations, and joint activities amongst Australia, the US, and other allies and 
security partners.
•	 Give particular attention to collaboration and consultation with the US in and related to Southeast Asia.
•	 Generate new opportunities for bilateral security engagement in Australia and in Australia’s nearby 
region, including facilities sharing and access, prepositioning of US equipment, weapons and other 
defence technology trade and development, and joint deployments and training.
•	 Explore and where possible expand possibilities to strengthen Australian deployments to bilateral and 
multilateral operations alongside American forces.
•	 Take initiative to strengthen Australian bilateral security relationships with other non-US allies  
and partners. 
•	 Deepen military-to-military and other security-related engagement with China and encourage greater 
trilateral security cooperation amongst Australia, China and the United States.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
•	 Western military spending has stabilised and in some cases declined after a period of rapid growth 
over the past decade, but this is not only a function of austerity.
•	 An expanding and diffuse set of security challenges are facing the United States (US) and its allies  
in Asia.
•	 The US will seek to build on its security framework to more effectively integrate economic, diplomatic, 
and cultural engagement.
•	 The US will ask its allies to take more responsibility for security, especially in their immediate 
neighbourhoods, but to do so while avoiding provocations. 
•	 The US will want help from its allies to both assure and deter China.
•	 The current period of austerity will end and US fundamental economic strength remains.
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FIGURE 1
Spending figures are in US$, at current prices and exchange rates. Countries are ranked according to  
military spending calculated using market exchange rates (MER).
Share of GDP (%)a
Rank  
2012 (2011)
Country Spending 
($ b., MER)
Change, 
2003–12 (%)
2012 2003 World 
share (%)
Spending 
($ b., PPP)b
1 (1) USA 682 32 4.4 3.7 39 682
2 (2) China [166] 175 [2.0 ] [2.1 ] [9.5 ] [249]
3 (3) Russia [90.7] 113 [4.4 ] [4.3 ] [5.2 ] [116]
4 (5) UK 60.8 4.9 2.5 2.5 3.5 57.5
5 (6) Japan 59.3 –3.6 1.0 1.0 3.4 46.0
Subtotal top 5 1 059 60
6 (5) France 58.9 –3.3 2.3 2.6 3.4 50.7
7 (8) Saudi Arabia 56.7 111 8.9 8.7 3.2 63.9
8 (7) India 46.1 65 2.5 2.8 2.6 119
9 (9) Germany [45.8] –1.5 [1.4 ] 1.4 [2.6 ] [42.8]
10 (11) Italy [34.0] –19 1.7 2.0 1.9 31.0
Subtotal top 10 1 301 74
11 (10) Brazil 33.1 56 [1.5 ] 1.5 [1.9 ] [34.4]
12 (12) South Korea 31.7 44 2.7 2.5 1.8 44.2
13 (13) Australia 26.2 29 1.7 1.9 1.5 16.3
14 (14) Canada [22.5] 36 [1.3 ] 1.1 [1.3 ] [18.3]
15 (15) Turkeyc [18.2] –2.1 2.3 3.4 [1.0 ] [25.9]
Subtotal top 15 1 432 82
World 1 753 35 2.5 2.4 100
[ ] = estimated figure; GDP = gross domestic product; PPP = purchasing power parity.
a   The figures for national military expenditure as a share of GDP are based on estimates for 2012 GDP from 
the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) World Economic Outlook database, Oct. 2012.
b   The figures for military expenditure at PPP exchange rates are estimates based on the projected implied 
PPP conversion rates for each country from the IMF World Economic Outlook database, Oct. 2012.
c   It is possible that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) would be in 15th  position in place of Turkey, but data is 
not available for the UAE in 2012. In 2011, the UAE’s military spending (in current prices) was estimated by 
SIPRI to be $19.2 billion.
Sources: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, <http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex/>;  
and IMF, World Economic Outlook database, Oct. 2012,  
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/index.aspx>.
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II. Defence spending and the security environment
Trends in defence spending seem quite clear.  US and allied defence spending is leveling out and in some 
cases declining, while the defence spending of other major countries—such as China, India, and Russia—is 
increasing (see Figure 1). 
Among the top 15 military spenders, which together accounted for 82 percent of the global total of military 
spending in 2012, declines from 2011 to 2012 were seen primarily among the Western allies.  More telling, 
however, are the longer-term declines for some of the Western allies.  For example, when gauged over the  
10 years from 2003 to 2012, military spending in Western allied states declined in Japan, France, Germany, Italy 
and Turkey between 1.5 and 19 percent.  Meanwhile, countries not formally allied with the United States have 
seen a rapid increase in their military spending over the past decade, 2003 to 2012.
But there is more here than meets the eye.  To begin, it is true that total global military spending actually declined 
between 2011 and 2012 (the first time that figure has decreased since 1998), largely a reflection of declines 
among Western allies. But in spite of these more austere figures, global military spending was still at historical 
highs in 2012, higher in real terms than it was even at its peak at the end of the Cold War, as shown in Figure 2.  
Moreover, many of the major Western allies amongst the top 15 spenders saw their military expenditures 
increase when measured over the course of the decade 2003-2012: United States up by 32 percent, and 
the United Kingdom, South Korea, Australia, and Canada up by 4.9, 44, 29, and 36 percent respectively (see 
Figure 1).  Moreover, US military spending was still nearly 70 percent higher in 2012 than it was in 2001 and in 
2012 accounted for nearly 40 percent of the global military expenditure, amounting to more than the next  
10 countries combined. Taken together, the 10 Western allies among the top 15 military spenders accounted 
for 60 percent of total global military spending in 2012 despite some leveling off in defence expenditure. 
And, to focus on Australia, while current military spending is down from its peak in 2010, the figure for 2012 
represents a 29 percent increase over spending a decade earlier in 2003 and a 36 percent increase over the 
figure for 2001, prior to the start of the global war on terror (see Figure 3).
FIGURE 2   WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURE, 1988–2012
SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
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In sum, looking at allied defence spending, it is true that growth in US and overall Western allied military 
spending is flattening and, in some individual cases, declining over the past several years.  However, that said, 
the US and nine allied countries among the top 15 military spenders increased their defence expenditures by 
an average of 11.64 percent for the period 2003 to 2012.  Moreover, in several key cases, US and Western allied 
military spending has seen significant increases—South Korea, Australia, Canada particularly—over this period.
In this situation—where defence spending among US allies is generally slowing though remains at significant 
levels—what is the security environment in the Asia-Pacific to which these resources will need to be targeted?  
Several key aspects stand out.  These are not unfamiliar and have been a part of an increasingly complex 
security environment for more than a decade.
The single most important development for US and allied security interests is the rise of China and particularly 
its increased capability in terms of comprehensive national power to shape security outcomes in the region.   
At the same time, China has also become an increasingly important economic partner to countries around the 
world and is the number one trading partner for all American treaty alliance partners in the Asia-Pacific region.
But at the same time, an expanding and more diffuse 
set of challenges, many arising not from states 
per se, but from non-state actors, is coming to the 
fore and demanding greater attention from national 
militaries, border control agencies, police forces, 
and intelligence services.  A part of the more diffuse 
environment is an increasing diversity and at times 
divergence of interests and policy directions across 
US allies and security partners.
In addition, the region is seeing a growing engagement by all key players in a range of multilateral institutions 
intended to address regional security challenges—both inclusive and exclusive in nature—presenting alternatives 
to the traditional, bilateral “hub and spoke” system of US alliances.  Even at their best, these mechanisms 
struggle to address regional security challenges effectively and in a sustained way.  But despite this weakness, 
these mechanisms make sense for the region as incubators of dialogue, platforms for nascent forms of 
multilateral security cooperation and confidence-building, and forums for expression of strategic concerns. 
Lastly, the Asia-Pacific security environment is also shaped in recent years by the American “rebalance” to  
the region.  This approach sets forth a clear strategic commitment—encompassing economic, diplomatic,  
and military components—to engage the dynamic Asia-Pacific region more purposefully for the long-term.   
It has been spelled out most authoritatively by Thomas Donilon, the US National Security Advisor in  
March 2013 where he emphasized the US President’s commitment to the strategy and outlined its five  
principal components: (1) strengthened alliances; (2) engaging emerging powers (such as India and Indonesia); 
(3) building a constructive relationship with China; (4) strengthening regional institutions; and (5) strengthening 
regional economic architecture.1
“ defence spending among US allies 
is generally slowing though remains  
at significant levels ”
FIGURE 3   AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE SPENDING, 2000-2012
In constant US million dollars
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
17994 18711 19512 19868 20687 21414 22562 23947 24820 26676 27006 26610 25555
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2012
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III. What does America want?
Given flattening and even declining resources for defence among Western allies on the one hand, and the 
increasingly complex nature of the region’s security environment on the other, what does America look for from 
its allies in the Asia-Pacific? 
Answers to this question will not be applicable in the same way across all the alliance partnerships.  But it is 
possible to consider some broad themes which have already emerged and are likely to remain in place for the 
short-to-medium-term.  In basic terms, America looks to its allies to cooperate in implementing a strategy 
which employs a more flexible, expanded, multifaceted, and integrated framework for security, 
encouraging more action and responsibility amongst allies, both individually and collaboratively, to 
address and mitigate security challenges at national, regional and even global levels.  
It is important to note from the outset that some partners will be more capable and interested than others to 
work with the United States in implementing such a strategy.  And it is worth highlighting that this approach 
is not simply driven by budgetary cutbacks.  Elements of this approach have been in place for many years, 
predating the current period of austerity—just as the “pivot” or “rebalancing” strategy well-predates 2011 and 
the seminal statements in that year of President Obama in Australia and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 
Foreign Policy.2
What are the apparent elements of this approach and where do we see it in action?
First, America will want to work with its allies to broaden the framework for security and more effectively 
integrate economic, diplomatic, even cultural engagement alongside and complementary to traditional defence 
and military aspects of security.  This is a more balanced effort to demonstrate that “forward-deployed 
diplomacy” and  particularly economic ties, along with defence engagement, are mutually reinforcing pathways 
to deepen US and allied commitment to and cooperation with one another. There are a number of undertakings 
already in this direction, and more should be expected as this strategy continues to unfold.  For example, in 
the economic realm, the United States has sought strong bilateral and multilateral trade agreements with many 
of its closest allies, such as through the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) which came in to force in 
January 2005 and the Republic of Korea-US FTA (March 2012).  The current negotiations to conclude the  
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement—involving Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand Peru, Singapore, the US, and Vietnam—is another example of American 
efforts to economically engage allies and other partners in the region in addition to strengthening defence and 
security ties.
The establishment of “2 + 2” dialogues—bringing 
together foreign and defence policy leaders at the 
ministerial level—is another way Washington seeks 
to broaden the framework for security relations.  The 
Australia-US Ministerial Consultation (AUSMIN), a  
2+2 process held regularly since the 1980s, has 
become a model for the US to follow with other allies.  
The US and Japan’s Security Consultative Committee  
is a 2 + 2 process going on for more than a decade. The US and Republic of Korea have held 2+2 meetings 
since 2010, and the US and the Philippines held their first in April 2012.  Allies can expect these to be intensified 
with more in the way of deliverables and deepening of relationships.
Beyond 2 + 2, we should also expect the US to expand collaboration with its allies on new security challenges 
which fall outside of the realm of traditional security and intersect with economic, resource and society related 
concerns: cybersecurity, domestic terrorism and insurgencies, energy security, refugee and other population 
flows, organized crime, climate-related problems, and others.
“ AUSMIN has become a model for 
the US to follow with other allies ”
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Second, the United States will look to its allies to take on more responsibility for their security in their 
immediate periphery, as well as in their nearby region, but doing so in a way to avoid provocative overreach.  
This will include American expectations and action to encourage and enable allies and other security partners 
to cooperate with the United States more effectively to meet commonly-held security challenges of the region.  
This will mean, for example, seeking partnerships with allies and other security partners to help disperse, pre-
position, and upgrade American and allied military assets, deepening military-to-military ties and exchanges, 
increasing allied responsiveness and capabilities, and improving joint military training and interoperability.  
This also includes partnering to help with the development of a country’s own defence capabilities through 
arms sales, defence technology agreements, and co-development and co-production arrangements. This 
will obviously entail much defence and military-to-military cooperation, but not exclusively so, and should be 
coordinated with economic and diplomatic undertakings.
Third, the United States will look to strengthen both formal and informal multilateralism, including, importantly, 
networks amongst American allies and other security partners.  This will mark a continuing effort to blend the 
traditional “hub and spokes” system with various forms of multilateral engagement amongst American allies 
and other security partners.
This will include encouraging greater ongoing coordination multilaterally across allied relationships—such as 
through the US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group, the Australia-Japan-US Trilateral 
Strategic Dialogue, and the more recent the Australia-Japan-United States Defense Leaders Trilateral Meeting.  
But this effort will also seek to encourage new groupings to include other security partners in the region 
such as India, Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam, or to involve new participants into ongoing multilateral 
mechanisms.  An interesting recent example of this latter approach comes with China’s acceptance of the 
Pentagon’s invitation to participate in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercises in 2014. 
The United States will also expect its allies and other security partners to cooperate in strengthening other 
existing multilateral organisations in the region—such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East 
Asia Summit (EAS), and their ability to address regional security challenges through diplomatic exchanges, 
policy reform, and concerted action to prevent and/or react to security threats in the region. 
Not all allies and partners are going to be comfortable with this approach as not all allies and partners see 
the benefits in the same ways and have varying reservations about such multilateralism.  For example, even 
between allies—such as Japan and South Korea—lingering historical distrust or other obstacles often hinder 
deeper cooperation.  Allies and security partners may also wish to avoid the appearance they are “ganging up” 
on China.  Or, in an interesting finding by Carl Baker and Brad Glosserman in their January 2013 study, there 
is little appetite among US allies in the region to formulate a consistent “alliance caucus” position within the 
larger multilateral organizations in the region such as the ARF or EAS.3  Washington is aware of these and other 
potential sensitivities, but will nonetheless seek to strengthen a variety of multilateral networks amongst its allies 
and security partners in the region.
Fourth, Washington will look to its allies and security partners to engage China in ways that both assure 
and deter.  This is a difficult and delicate balance to achieve for America itself, one which recognizes and 
encourages a growing constructive role for China in the region, but also hedges against a growing potential 
for confrontation with a rising China.  It is a balance all the more difficult to achieve in partnership with regional 
allies given the range of different interests, concerns, and national strategies the regional allies (and other 
security partners in the region) have vis-à-vis a rising China. 
The Obama-Xi “shirtsleeve summit” in June this year is particularly important in this context as it helped set a 
positive tone for the US-China relationship early in the administration of the new Chinese leader.  The key point 
for allies and other security partners to understand is that the United States does not seek a confrontation with 
China and sees value in engagement while also assuring a continued delivery of a deterrent message for China 
and for US allies. The engagement side of this balance remains the most important, most preferred and most 
likely to be sustained, and the US will look to its allies to strike this formulation as well.
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IV. And for Australia?
Looking more specifically at US expectations for its alliance with Australia, all signs point to the growing 
importance of this special partnership.  As with other partners, the US will seek to strengthen a range 
of cooperative activities with Australia, including through multilateral institutions regionally and globally, 
partnerships with other allies, and engagement of China.
In Australia itself, this will include some expectation to expand the sharing of facilities, such as the relocation 
and establishment of a C-band space surveillance radar and the transfer of an advanced space surveillance 
telescope, both to Western Australia.  The continued increase in US Marine training rotations at Darwin’s 
Robertson Barracks is another example of how the US and Australia can increase joint activities on Australian 
soil.  Looking ahead, the two countries will likely continue to explore ways to preposition US equipment in 
Australia and take steps to slowly increase US access to Australian facilities such as airfields in the Northern 
Territory and to naval bases such as HMAS Stirling in Western Australia.  Washington will continue to appreciate 
and look to expand sharing of facilities and expertise in other areas, such as in intelligence cooperation, 
conducting joint planning and exercises, and strategic consultations.
Within the broader region, the United States will look to Australia to maintain and expand its capability to 
provide for Australia’s defence but also to contribute to security operations in Australia’s near-abroad and 
further afield where possible through improved interoperability and joint operations with the US and other allied 
forces.  The US will look to the Australian navy to continue its important contributions to three combined task 
forces (CTF-150, CTF-151, and CTF-152) of the Combined Maritime Forces in the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, Indian 
Ocean, Gulf of Oman, and Persian Gulf, conducting counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, and other maritime 
security operations.  Similarly, Australia’s preparedness to embed with other US and allied operations—for 
example, the deployment in 2013 of the guided missile frigate HMAS Sydney with the US Seventh Fleet in 
Northeast Asia—is viewed very positively and as a model for future cooperation.  The United States will also 
look to Australia to expand its activities in cooperation with other US allies and partners, such as the ongoing 
training for Philippine armed forces and the establishment of the Australia-Indonesia “2 + 2” (March 2012) and 
the Australia-Republic of Korea “2 + 2” (July 2013).
Beyond military-to-military activities, Washington would 
welcome cooperation with Australia to strengthen 
regional multilateral institutions in the region, such 
as the EAS, the ARF, the TPP, and other multilateral 
bodies which can help strengthen stability and 
prosperity in the region.  Conclusion of the TPP will be 
a particularly high priority for Washington in the coming 
months.  More broadly, the US will continue to see 
great value in its partnership with Australia at a global 
level as well, working through the United Nations Security Council and in other bodies to address challenges 
facing the international community—such as climate change, proliferation, cybersecurity, and illicit trafficking 
and other transnational crime—where the two countries can seek common approaches and outcomes.
The United States will also welcome a continued strong and constructive relationship between Australia and 
China.  This includes support for the establishment and growth of the Australia-China strategic partnership, and 
ongoing defence and military-to-military ties between Australia and China such as the annual Defence Strategic 
Dialogue and cooperation and joint humanitarian and disaster relief exercises.  Looking ahead, Washington will 
likely look to explore forms of trilateral and other multilateral defence cooperation with Australia and China.
While working in these and other areas to realise an even more effective partnership with Australia,  
Washington will continue to seek what may be the most valued Australian asset: straightforward, well-informed 
strategic advice on how the United States and Australia can achieve their common interests nationally, 
regionally, and globally.
“ Washington will likely look to explore 
forms of trilateral and other multilateral 
defence cooperation with Australia 
and China ”
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V. Future prospects: brighter than many think
Concerns about austerity and its impact are warranted.  But at the same time we should not overlook the 
prospects for the United States and other allies and partners in the coming decades and how they compare 
with other countries, such as China.  A more-than-plausible case can be made that the current downturn in 
US fiscal fortunes is temporary and indeed comes at a time of relative stability when no major rival akin to 
Wilhemine or Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or the Soviet Union, threatens to overturn the international order  
or presents an existential challenge to the United States or its allies.
The United States enjoys a range of fundamental and intrinsic attributes which bode well for the country 
over the medium-to-long-term: an advantageous geostrategic position, natural endowments of land and 
other resources, favourable demographics, openness to immigration, competition, and innovation, and a 
comparatively cohesive and predictable sociopolitical and legal order.
By comparison, other countries in the region and beyond, face enormous long-term problems, not least China.  
China will be dealing with a range of difficult and in some cases immutable challenges, including a negative 
demographic picture, environmental degradation, resource scarcity (not least water and land, but also energy), 
and geostrategic vulnerability, as well as a brittle and too-often corrupted political system.  Not only will these 
and other challenges constrain and perhaps thwart Chinese ambitions, these very challenges make it more 
likely that China will not fundamentally challenge the current international and regional system from which it 
gains the benefits it desperately needs if it hopes to mitigate and overcome those challenges.
In conclusion, it is important to recognse that the current period of austerity will not always be thus and the 
prospects for America and American alliances and other partnerships in the region—including with China—hold 
more promise than many seem to believe.
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
•	 Work with US partners to define and build a more expansive and comprehensive mutual security 
framework at both political and working levels, to encompass greater engagement across the 
spectrum of the relationship: on trade and investment; greener energy solutions; diplomatic initiatives; 
people-to-people exchanges; education, innovation and science programs; and defence and security 
cooperation.
•	 Continue to engage and encourage active US participation in and commitment to effective, problem-
oriented multilateral mechanisms in the region, both formal and informal, including multilateral 
collaborations, consultations, and joint activities amongst Australia, the US, and other allies and 
security partners.
•	 Give particular attention to collaboration and consultation with the US in and related to Southeast Asia.
•	 Generate new opportunities for bilateral security engagement in Australia and in Australia’s nearby 
region, including facilities sharing and access, prepositioning of US equipment, weapons and other 
defence technology trade and development, and joint deployments and training.
•	 Explore and where possible expand possibilities to strengthen Australian deployments to bilateral and 
multilateral operations alongside American forces.
•	 Take initiative to strengthen Australian bilateral security relationships with other non-US allies  
and partners. 
•	 Deepen military-to-military and other security-related engagement with China and encourage greater 
trilateral security cooperation amongst Australia, China and the United States.
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